\u3ci\u3eFlorida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.\u3c/i\u3e: Restricting Attorney Advertising to Preserve the Image of the Legal Profession by Vanderwater, Jodi
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 27
Issue 3 Spring 1996 Article 9
1996
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.: Restricting Attorney
Advertising to Preserve the Image of the Legal
Profession
Jodi Vanderwater
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons, and the Legal Profession
Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jodi Vanderwater, Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.: Restricting Attorney Advertising to Preserve the Image of the Legal Profession, 27 Loy. U.
Chi. L. J. 765 (1996).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol27/iss3/9
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.:
Restricting Attorney Advertising to Preserve
the Image of the Legal Profession
I. INTRODUCTION
[Jiudicial regulation of the [legal] profession is essential to both
the courts and the profession. Professional responsibility is
equally essential. Lawyers should never forget that they are
members of a profession, not a business. Lawyers' primary
responsibility is to serve the client, the justice system and the
public.'
Attorney advertising has traditionally been a heated topic in the area
of professional responsibility.' Lawyers were first granted the right to
advertise nearly two decades ago. 3 Since that time, states have at-
tempted to ascertain their constitutional role in the regulation of
attorney advertising.4 Until Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.,5 the
Supreme Court had rejected the vast majority of attempted state regu-
lations.6 In Went For It, however, the Court upheld a regulation
requiring attorneys to wait thirty days before sending targeted, direct-
mail solicitations to victims of an accident.7
1. CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, LAWYER
REGULATION FOR A NEW CENTURY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF
DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 9 (1992) [hereinafter CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY].
2. COMMISSION ON ADVERTISING, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, LAWYER ADVERTISING AT THE
CROSSROADS: PROFESSIONAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 1 (1995) [hereinafter CROSSROADS]
(discussing how attorney advertising has set off an "unabated and unresolved" debate
within the legal field).
3. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977). For a discussion of this case,
see infra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 469-71 (1988)
(attempting to ban all targeted direct-mail solicitations); Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 632-33 (1985) (attempting to restrict the use of
drawings and illustrations in legal ads).
5. 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
6. See, e.g., Shapero, 486 U.S. at 473-74 (holding that an outright ban on truthful,
non-deceptive mailings is unconstitutional); Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 647 (holding that
truthful advertising in a newspaper cannot be suppressed through regulation that does
not directly advance a substantial state interest).
7. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2381. A targeted, direct-mail solicitation is "a mailing
sent by a lawyer to a person with a specific legal problem, which mentions or discusses
that problem. The mailing usually advises the recipient of her legal rights, and suggests
that she contact the sender . . . to discuss representation." Debra Antzis, Profes-
sionalism, the First Amendment and Targeted Direct Mailing by Attorneys: Shapero v.
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In the twenty years preceding Went For It, the Supreme Court had
the opportunity to review a number of cases addressing the limits of
attorney advertising.8 During these years, the Court indicated a will-
ingness to expand the sphere of constitutionally protected speech in the
areas of attorney advertising,9 and states continued to "push the enve-
lope" in testing these parameters.' ° However, the Court repeatedly
struck down state regulations, holding that they violated an attorney's
right to free commercial speech under the First Amendment." Until
Went For It, no state proffered a substantial interest, nor devised a
regulation sufficiently related to such an interest, that justified en-
croaching upon attorneys' First Amendment rights. 2 In Went For It,
the Court found a significant state interest-protecting the image of the
legal profession-and an acceptable regulation-a thirty-day moratori-
um on targeted, direct-mail solicitation. 3
This Note examines the origin and development of the commercial
speech doctrine under the First Amendment.' 4 Next, this Note dis-
cusses the extension of commercial speech protections to attorney
advertising, 5 and the Court's attempts to define the limits of that
protection. 6 Subsequently, this Note discusses the facts of Went For
It and the opinions of the lower courts and the United States Supreme
Court. 7 This Note then analyzes the Went For It decision, illustrating
the consistency of this opinion with past precedent. 8 Next, this Note
Kentucky Bar Association, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 561, 561 (1988).
8. For a discussion of the development of law in this area, see infra part 11.
9. See Shapero, 486 U.S. at 466 (extending constitutional protection to targeted,
direct-mail solicitation); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 206 (1982) (extending consti-
tutional protection to mass mailings and published advertisements); In re Primus, 436
U.S. 412, 439 (1978) (extending constitutional protection to some in-person-solici-
tations).
10. See, e.g., The Florida Bar: Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating the Florida
Bar-Advertising Issues, 571 So. 2d 451, 452 (Fla. 1991) (imposing restrictions on
advertising for members of the Florida Bar). See infra part ll.B.
11. See infra part II.A.I for a discussion of the commercial speech doctrine.
12. See infra part II.
13. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2381. The Bar asserted that protecting the privacy and
tranquillity of accident victims would help protect the image of the legal profession. Id.
For an example of the Court's approval of use of a state's power to regulate speech in the
interest of protecting the privacy of its citizens, see Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,
488 (1988) (holding that the state's interest in protecting the privacy of a doctor's
personal residence justified the prohibition of abortion picketers outside his home).
This Note will focus on the asserted state interest of protecting the legal profession.
14. See infra part II.A.
15. See infra part lI.B.l.
16. See infra part II.B.2.
17. See infra part Il1.
18. See infra part IV.
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anticipates the effect of this decision on state regulation of attorney ad-
vertising, as well as on state regulation of advertising in other areas.' 9
Finally, this Note concludes that the Supreme Court acted properly in
upholding the restriction on attorney advertising in Went For It.20
II. BACKGROUND
A. The First Amendment: Protecting Certain Classes of Speech
On its face, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
appears to be straightforward and explicit. It states:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.
2 1
Despite the facial simplicity of the First Amendment, courts recog-
nize that the First Amendment does not confer upon Americans the
unequivocal right to say anything they want.22 Rather, courts have
interpreted the Constitution to protect only certain classes of speech.23
The division of speech into classifications, some protected and some
not, is rooted more in the social structure of early American history
than in formal legislation. 4 When the founding fathers first drafted
the Bill of Rights, its freedoms theoretically applied to all citizens.25
Realistically, however, the protections of the Bill of Rights were pri-
marily enjoyed by the white male establishment. 26 In the years follow-
ing the adoption of the First Amendment, for example, Congress
19. See infra part V.
20. See infra part VI.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
22. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1961) ("[W]e reject the view that
freedom of speech and association, as protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, are 'absolutes' .. .. [Tihis Court has consistently recognized . . . ways in
which constitutionally protected freedom of speech is narrower than an unlimited license
to talk.") (citations omitted).
23. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 994 (12th ed. 1991). For example, the
Court has consistently protected political speech because of its role in the process of
self government. See infra note 34 and accompanying text. The Court, however, has
historically been reluctant to afford protection to speech that has little social utility,
such as provocative or offensive speech. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 572 (1944) (establishing that the public's interest in order supersedes an
individual's right to engage in "fighting words").
24. THOMAS L. TEDFORD, FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 40 (1985).
25. Id. at42.
26. Id. at 40.
1996]
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enacted legislation to protect the status quo by forbidding certain
groups from speaking out against "the establishment., 27
The question of the constitutionality of speech classifications did not
reach the Supreme Court until 1919.28 In Schenck v. United States,29
a unanimous Court upheld a man's conviction for distributing pam-
phlets urging men to resist the military draft.30 The Court reasoned
that the defendant's actions presented a "clear and present danger" to
the public and the government. 3' The Schenck decision set the stage
for the Court to uphold restrictions on "harmful" speech, including
some advertisements, in subsequent cases.32
1. The Commercial Speech Doctrine:
Constitutional Protection of Advertising
Early First Amendment scholars argued that advertising possessed
little social value. 33 Scholars determined that advertising, unlike politi-
cal speech, which was perceived as informative in nature, performed
no function "essential to the process of self government., 34 Scholars
27. Id. Slaves and aliens were the targets of these first restrictions on speech. Id.
For example, the slave code forbade black preachers from preaching without the
presence of a white man, and the Alien and Sedition Acts were widely used to prevent
aliens from publicly speaking. Id. at 41, 43.
28. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 52. In Schenck, the circuit court convicted the general secretary of the
Socialist Party of violating the Espionage Act. Id. at 49. The Espionage Acts were
originally passed primarily to prevent the transmission of military secrets to enemies of
the United States. TEDFORD, supra note 24, at 69. However, the Acts were widely used to
suppress any anti-war speech. Id. The May 16, 1918 amendment to the Act stated in
relevant part:
[W]hoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully utter, print, write,
or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the
form of government of the United States... or publish any language intended
to incite, provoke, or encourage resistance to the United States, or to promote
the cause of its enemies . . . shall be punished by a fine of not more than
$10,000 or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both ....
Id. at 70-71 (quoting the Espionage Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 557 (1918) (repealed by 50
U.S.C. § 205 (1954))). The defendant argued that the Act violated his First Amendment
rights. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 49.
3 1. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
32. TEDFORD, supra note 24, at 234. The author argues that deceptive advertising
throughout history caused a deep mistrust of commercial advertising. Id.
33. Id. An early First Amendment scholar, Alexander Meiklejohn, postulated that
"'the constitutional status of a merchant advertising his wares,' or of a 'paid lobbyist
fighting for the advantage of his client is utterly different from that of a citizen who is
planning for the general welfare."' Id. at 236 (quoting ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, Free
Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government, in POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 37 (1965)).
34. Id. at 234; see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964)
1996] Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc. 769
and courts viewed advertising as a type of speech that was calculated
to enable the speaker to earn money. 35 The Supreme Court dubbed
such discourse "commercial speech. 36
The Court first addressed the constitutionality of state restrictions on
commercial speech in Valentine v. Chrestensen." In Valentine, a
unanimous Court refused to recognize any constitutional protection for
commercial speech.3 s The Court stated that "the Constitution imposes
no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial adver-
tising., 39 The Court, however, declined to elaborate on the factors
distinguishing purely commercial speech from speech that the First
Amendment did protect.4° Although the advertisement at issue con-
tained both political and commercial information, because of the spe-
cific facts of the case, the Court declined to address whether the
political portion of such communications was entitled to any First
Amendment protections.4
(holding that political advertisements were protected under the First Amendment because
they "communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested
claimed abuses ... on behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives are matters
of the highest public interest and concern").
35. See Central Hudson Gas and Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
561 (1980). The Court defined advertising as "[an] expression related solely to the
economic interests of the speaker and its audience." Id.
36. Id.
37. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
38. Id. at 54-55. At issue was the New York City Sanitary Code, which forbade the
distribution of "commercial and business advertising matter." Id. at 53. The
respondent, a Florida businessman seeking to advertise his traveling business, printed a
two-sided handbill. Id. He owned a decommissioned United States Navy submarine,
which he exhibited in various cities. Id. at 52. The handbill solicited visitors to his
exhibit. Id. at 53. On one side was a solicitation for business; on the reverse was a
political protest. Id. Valentine was protesting.the city's recent refusal to allow him to
dock at a nearby wharf. Id.
39. Id. at 54. The Supreme Court opined that distribution of the political protest
alone would be protected under the Constitution, reasoning that the Constitution
protected speech that "communicat[ed] information and disseminat[ed] opinion." Id.
The Court stated:
This court [sic] has unequivocally held that the streets are proper places for the
exercise of the freedom of communicating information and disseminating
opinion and that, though the states and municipalities may appropriately
regulate the privilege for the public interest, they may not unduly burden or
proscribe its employment in these public thoroughfares.
Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 54. The Court determined that Valentine intentionally printed the political
protest as a deliberate attempt to evade the statute, and on that ground affirmed his
conviction. Id. at 55.
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In the thirty years that followed, Valentine proved invincible.42 Not
until 1975 did the Court indicate a willingness to reconsider consti-
tutional protection for commercial speech.43 In Bigelow v. Virginia,
the Supreme Court for the first time held that commercial speech did in
fact enjoy some First Amendment protections." The Bigelow Court
overturned a state law forbidding the publication of materials that
encouraged women to have abortions, holding that the statute infringed
on constitutionally protected expression.45 The Court rejected the
lower courts' reliance on Valentine, finding that case to be distinguish-
able.46 The Court emphasized that while the advertisement at issue in
Valentine contained noncommercial information, the sole purpose for
issuing the leaflet was for pecuniary gain.47 In contrast, the Bigelow
advertisement "did more than simply propose a commercial trans-
action. 48 The Bigelow advertisement conveyed information of public
interest to seekers of that knowledge. 49 The Court found that the First
Amendment protected such communication. 0
42. LOUISE L. HILL, LAWYER ADVERTISING 24-28 (1993) (explaining that the Valentine
holding effectively precluded any successful argument for First Amendment protection
for commercial speech for 30 years).
43. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
44. Id. at 822. "The fact that the particular advertisement ... had commercial aspects
• . . did not negate all First Amendment guarantees. The State was not free of
constitutional restraint merely because the advertisement involved sales or
'solicitation,' . . . or because ... the motive of the advertiser may have involved
financial gain." id. at 818 (citations omitted).
45. Id. at 829. A Virginia statute forbade the publication of any material encouraging
abortions. The statute read: "'If any person, by publication, lecture, advertisement, or
by the sale or circulation of any publication, or in any other manner, encourage or
prompt the procuring of abortion or miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."'
Id. at 812-13 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-63 (Michie 1960)).
In Bigelow, the circuit court convicted the managing editor of a Virginia newspaper of
a misdemeanor for publishing an advertisement for a women's health services
organization which provided legal abortions. Id. at 814. The editor appealed the circuit
court decision, arguing that the advertisement was informational and did not encourage
or prompt abortions, in violation of the statute. Id.
46. Id. at 819-21 (stating that the Valentine holding is limited to the manner in
which commercial advertisements could be distributed).
47. Id. at 819.
48. Id. at 822.
49. Id. The Court was specifically referring to a portion of the advertisement
announcing: "Abortions are now legal in New York. There are no residency require-
ments." Id.
50. Id. at 822. The Court stated that the advertisement in Bigelow "involve[d] the
exercise of the freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion." Id.
This classification of speech is exactly the kind defined by the Valentine Court as being
protected by the First Amendment. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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The Bigelow Court held that speech does not necessarily lose First
Amendment protection merely because it is in the form of a commercial
advertisement. 5' The Court made it clear that commercial speech that
is informative in nature warrants First Amendment protection.52 The
Court did not specify, however, the precise scope of this protection. 3
Within one year, the Court clarified and expanded its holding in
Bigelow.54 In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., the Court again held that the First Amend-
ment affords some protection to commercial speech.55 The Court also
found, however, that commercial speech was protected even where the
advertiser's interest was solely pecuniary.56 Thus, Virginia Pharmacy
marked the first time the Court acknowledged significant constitutional
protection for commercial speech.57
The Court, recognizing the limited application of Bigelow, framed
the issue before it as whether the First Amendment protected commer-
cial speech that, unlike in Bigelow, contained no information pertain-
51. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 809. "The fact that the particular advertisement in
appellant's newspaper had commercial aspects or reflected the advertiser's commercial
interests did not negate all First Amendment guarantees. The State was not free of
constitutional restraint merely because . . . the motive of the advertiser may have
involved financial gain." Id. (citations omitted).
52. Id. at 821-22.
53. Id. at 825 n.10.
54. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
55. Id. at 771-72.
56. Id. at 762-63. In Virginia Pharmacy, the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
sought to protect the profession by eliminating aggressive price competition which, it
argued, would hinder the ability of pharmacists to supply professional services. Id. at
767-68. The Board argued that advertising would "reduce the pharmacist's status to that
of a mere retailer." Id. at 768. To that end, the Virginia legislature passed a law
preventing pharmacists from advertising the prices of prescription drugs. Id. at 749-50.
Consumers of prescription drugs challenged the Virginia statute. Id. at 753. The
consumers argued that they would benefit from the free flow of commercial information.
Id. at 754.
57. Note, however, the Court's hesitancy to extend this decision to attorneys or
physicians. Id. at 773 n.25. The Court emphasized:
We stress that we have considered in this case the regulation of commercial
advertising by pharmacists. Although we express no opinion as to other
professions, the distinctions, historical and functional, between professions,
may require consideration of quite different factors. Physicians and lawyers,
for example, do not dispense standardized products; they render professional
Services of almost infinite variety and nature, with the consequent enhanced
possibility for confusion and deception if they were to undertake certain kinds
of advertising.
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ing to the public interest.58 In deciding this issue, the Court rejected
the commercial speech analysis in Valentine,59 holding that a state can-
not completely suppress the dissemination of truthful material concern-
ing lawful activities, despite its purely commercial nature.6° The Court
emphasized the rights of state citizens to receive such information.6'
The Court stated that the public interest in having an "intelligent and
well informed consumer" renders commercial advertising "indispens-
able. 62
2. The Central Hudson decision: Establishing Guidelines for
Evaluating Commercial Speech
While the Court found that the First Amendment protected
commercial speech, the Court determined in subsequent cases that
such speech was not entitled to the higher levels of protection given
other forms of speech, such as communications that involve political
or public policy issues.63 The Court found that although state laws
inhibiting the latter would be examined with the highest scrutiny, those
restricting commercial speech would be considered under the inter-
mediate scrutiny standard.64
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commis-
sion, the Court articulated a four-pronged test to implement this inter-
mediate standard: 65 (1) states may freely regulate any material that is
misleading, deceptive, or that relates to illegal activity; (2) states
58. Id. at 760-61 (stating that "the question whether there is a First Amendment
exception for 'commercial speech' is squarely before us"). According to the Court,
pharmacists simply wished to communicate, and consumers wished to hear, the
following message: "I will sell you the X prescription drug at the Y price." 1d. at 761.
59. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Valentine
decision.
60. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 772 (1976).
6 1. Id. at 756-57. The Court explained that freedom of speech protection is afforded
to the recipients of the communication as well as the speaker and the source. Id.
62. Id. at 765.
63. See Central Hudson Gas and Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
563 (1980) (determining that intermediate scrutiny was appropriate because "[t]he
Constitution . . . accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other
constitutionally guaranteed expression." Id. at 562-63 (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978)).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 566. The Central Hudson test is sometimes referred to as a three-pronged
test. Courts that construe Central Hudson to have only three prongs generally do not
address the first prong unless the accuracy or legality of the material is an issue in the
case. See, e.g., Florida State Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2376 (1995).
See infra note 159 for a discussion of the Went For It Court's interpretation of Central
Hudson.
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seeking to regulate commercial speech must assert a substantial state
interest; (3) restrictions on commercial speech must directly advance
the asserted state interest; and (4) the regulation may not be more ex-
tensive than necessary to serve that interest.66
In 1985, the Court had the opportunity to apply Central Hudson in
Bolger v. Young Drug Products Corp.67 At issue in Bolger was
whether a state could constitutionally prohibit an advertiser from mail-
ing potentially offensive materials. 68 The Court, holding that a state
could not prohibit such advertising, noted that unlike other forms of
advertising, offensive material received in the mail could easily be
disposed of by the recipient.69
B. Extension of First Amendment Protection to Attorney Advertising
1. Attorney Advertising Cases Before Central Hudson
In 1977, three years before the Court decided Central Hudson, the
Court first extended the scope of First Amendment protection to the
legal profession. 70  The early commercial speech cases concerning
66. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. Under Central Hudson, a state could fail the last
prong if another manner of regulating existed that was less restrictive. Id. at 564. This
"least restrictive means" test was later broadened. Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S.
469, 469-71 (1989) (upholding a state university policy that prohibited private
commercial enterprises from operating in the university's facilities and expanding the
test articulated in Central Hudson). Id. Because there almost always exists some
conceivable means that is less restrictive, the Court held that a reasonably fit test was
more appropriate. Id. at 477.
67. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
68. Id. at 62. In Bolger, a contraceptive manufacturer undertook a marketing effort
that involved mailing the public various unsolicited materials about the contraceptives.
Id. The federal government subsequently prosecuted Bolger for violating a federal law
prohibiting such mailings. Id. at 61. Bolger challenged the law as violating his right
to free speech. Id. at 63. Cognizant of the Central Hudson requirements, the
government argued that it had a substantial interest in the law for two reasons: (1) it had
an interest in protecting recipients from offensive material, and (2) it had an interest in
helping parents regulate the manner in which their children learn about sensitive and
important subjects such as contraceptives. Id. at 71.
69. Id. at 72. The Court rejected both asserted government interests. Id. Disposal of
offensive advertisements "[was] an acceptable burden, at least so far as the Constitution
[was] concerned," to place upon the recipient. Id. (quoting Lamont v. Commissioner of
Motor Vehicles, 269 F. Supp. 880, 883 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 386 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 391 U.S. 915 (1968)). Concerning parental regulation of children's
knowledge about contraception, the Bolger Court stated that parents already possessed
the ability to regulate such knowledge because they have control over the mail they
receive. Id. at 73. Thus, the minute protection offered by banning all contraceptive
advertisements did not materially advance the asserted interest, and, therefore, the
regulation failed under the second prong of Central Hudson. Id.
70. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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attorney advertising illustrate how the Court struggled with applying
existing case law to differing fact patterns.7
The Supreme Court, in initially granting commercial speech consti-
tutional protection, made a material qualification.72 In a footnote to
Virginia Pharmacy, the Court alluded to the legal profession as a dis-
tinct profession where advertising would remain inappropriate.73 In
response to this footnote, the American Bar Association ("ABA") a-
mended Disciplinary Rule ("DR") 2-101 (B) to prohibit attorney adver-
tising.74 Following the lead of the ABA, the State of Arizona incorpo-
rated DR 2-101(B) into its state supreme court rules. In Bates v.
State Bar, however, the Supreme Court held that the Arizona regu-
lation was impermissible, reasoning that attorney advertising, as a
form of commercial speech, deserved First Amendment protection.76
71. See, e.g., In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n,
436 U.S. 447 (1978); Bates, 433 U.S. at 363-66. See infra notes 72-101.
72. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 773 n.25 (1976).
73. Id. at 773 n.25. For the text of this footnote, see supra note 57.
74. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101 (B) (1976).
75. Bates, 433 U.S. at 355. Arizona adopted DR 2-101(B) as Rule 29(a) of the
Supreme Court of Arizona. The disciplinary rule provided:
A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or any other
lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper or
magazine advertisements, radio or television announcements, display
advertisements in the city or telephone directories or other means of
commercial publicity, nor shall he authorize or permit others to do so on his
behalf.
Id. (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17(A) (Supp. 1976)).
76. Id. at 350. "Advertising, though entirely commercial, may often carry infor-
mation of import to significant issues of the day." Id. at 364 (citing Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975)).
In Bates, two attorneys opened a legal clinic with the intent of providing legal
services at reasonable fees to middle class citizens who did not qualify for legal aid, yet
still needed legal representation. Id. at 354. The clinic handled only "routine matters,"
such as uncontested divorces and adoptions, simple personal bankruptcies, and name
changes. Id. Because their fees were to be lower, the attorneys felt the need to advertise
to obtain a certain volume of business. Id. Consequently, they placed an advertisement
in an Arizona newspaper, knowingly violating the Arizona statute. Id. The Arizona
disciplinary board sanctioned both after the president of the State Bar Association filed a
complaint. Id. at 355-56.
Arguing violations of the First Amendment, the attorneys appealed to the Supreme
Court of Arizona. Id. at 356. Specifically, the attorneys contended that their
advertisement was indistinguishable from the one in Virginia Pharmacy because both
advertised for the prices of routine services. Id. at 354, 358.
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Applying Virginia Pharmacy to Bates," the Court held that a state
could not prohibit truthful newspaper advertisements that disseminated
the prices of routine legal services.78 The Court reiterated the interest
of the consumer in the free flow of information, a point the Court had
similarly emphasized in Virginia Pharmacy.79 The Court then balanced
this interest against the State's multiple justifications for the advertising
ban.80 The Court concluded that no proffered justification, including
concern for the adverse effects on the profession, warranted a com-
plete ban on attorney advertising.8' The Court rejected the argument
that advertising would erode the legal profession, because the public
knows that lawyers make a living off of their profession.82 Thus, the
Court in Bates brought attorney advertising into the realm of protected
commercial speech.
Once the Court established that the First Amendment also protected
attorney advertising, the debate shifted to how that advertising could
be regulated by states.83 Because the Bates Court narrowed the issue,
the states had the opportunity to promulgate regulations on attorney
advertising that would test the constitutional limits on the regulation of
attorney advertising."
State regulation evolved in response to the ABA's amendment
modifying the Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("MRPC"),
77. The Supreme Court conducted an extensive review of the Virginia Pharmacy case
and stated that it had reserved judgment on the constitutional issue of attorney
advertising in Virginia Pharmacy because of the differences between the legal and
pharmaceutical professions. Id. at 363-66.
78. Id. at 384. The Court explicitly reserved judgment on the issue of in-person
solicitation of accident victims for a future date. Id. at 366 (declining to address the
issue of "in-person solicitation of clients at the hospital room or the accident site, or in
any other situation that breeds undue influence by attorneys or their agents").
79. Id. at 364. "The listener's interest is substantial: the consumer's concern for the
free flow of commercial speech often may be far keener than his concern for urgent
political dialogue . . . . [C]ommercial speech serves to inform the public of the
availability, nature and prices of products, and services . I..." ld. (citations omitted).
80. Id. The state offered six reasons for the restriction of price advertising: (1) the
adverse effect on professionalism; (2) the inherently misleading nature of attorney
advertising; (3) the adverse effect on the administration of justice; (4) the undesirable
economic effects of advertising; (5) the adverse effect of advertising on the quality of
services; and (6) the difficulties of enforcement. Id. at 368-79. See id. for an in-depth
discussion of each proffered reason.
81. id. at 379.
82. Id. at 368. The Court advised that a client will not lose confidence and trust in his
attorney by learning that the attorney is motivated by financial concerns. Id. at 368-69.
83. HILL, supra note 42, at 59 (relying on David W. Parr, Note, Direct-Mail
Solicitation By Attorneys: Bates to R.M.J., 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1041, 1051 (1982)).
84. Bates, 433 U.S. at 359-60 n.l I (explaining that the Court never intended to
diminish the authority of the state to regulate anti-competitive conduct).
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which were changed to permit attorney advertising, keeping in line
with Bates.85 Nearly two thirds of the states followed the ABA's lead
and created rules regulating the professional conduct of attorneys
based upon the MRPC.86 Although the MRPC served as a guideline,
numerous jurisdictions adapted their rules to reflect individual tolera-
tion for various types of advertising.87 States placed responsibility for
ensuring the professional conduct of attorneys in the hands of state
disciplinary committees. 8' States gave these committees the power to
bring charges against violating members.8 9 The first state regulations
to reach the Supreme Court prohibited in-person solicitation, an issue
the Court had previously declined to address. 9°
In 1978, the Court heard two cases challenging state rules prohibit-
ing in-person solicitations by attorneys. The Court overturned the reg-
ulation in one case, and upheld a similar regulation in the other.9'
First, in In re Primus, the Court granted complete First Amendment
protection to an American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") attorney
who personally solicited clients whose constitutional rights she be-
lieved may have been violated.92 The Court found that the attorney
85. HILL, supra note 42, at 90.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note I, at 2. Thirteen states
expressly provide for judicial regulation of attorneys in their state constitutions. Id.
The remainder of the states have created this authority judicially. Id.
89. Id. at xvii (stating that "[disciplinary agencies] can (1) negotiate a private
admonition or public reprimand with the respondent's consent, or (2) hold a formal
hearing").
90. See In Re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 418-21 (1978) (determining the permissibility
of the in-person solicitation of women who were forced to undergo sterilization
procedures as a condition of receiving welfare); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436
U.S. 447, 453 (1978) (determining the permissibility of the in-person solicitation of
accident victims). See also supra note 78 for a discussion of the Court's reservation of
judgment on the issue of in-person solicitations.
91. Primus, 436 U.S. at 439 (granting protection); Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 459, 467
(denying protection).
92. Primus, 436 U.S. at 431-32. In Primus, the ACLU learned that some pregnant
mothers receiving Medicaid benefits were being threatened with sterilization as a
condition of receiving those benefits. Id. at 415. A local organization requested Edna
Smith Primus, an ACLU attorney, to speak at a meeting of concerned women. Id.
Following the meeting, the local organization again contacted Primus, informing her
that one of the women wished to file a lawsuit. Id. at 415-17. Primus subsequently sent
the woman a letter, informing her of the ACLU's willingness to undertake the
representation. Id. at 416-17.
The state disciplinary committee filed a formal complaint against Primus, alleging
that she violated state regulations prohibiting the solicitation of clients. Id. at 418-21.
The committee privately reprimanded Primus. Id. at 420. The Supreme Court of South
Carolina affirmed the private reprimand, and sua sponte, ordered public reprimand. Id. at
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engaged in constitutionally protected political speech.93 The Court de-
termined that her speech was motivated by both personal political
beliefs and the ACLU's political agenda, rather than any pecuniary in-
terest. 94 Thus, because the motivation for the solicitation was not
pecuniary gain, the Court held that the in-person solicitation warranted
protection under the First Amendment.95
In contrast, the Court upheld a regulation prohibiting in-person
solicitations in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n.96 The Court heard
Ohralik on the same day as Primus, allowing for a careful comparison
of the two cases. In Ohralik, an attorney personally visited two young
accident victims shortly after the accident occurred.9 7 The Court held
that the state bar properly forbade such actions, and upheld sanctions
against the attorney.9 The Court distinguished Ohralik from Primus,
noting that the lawyer's hope of financial gain in Ohralik posed pos-
sible dangers to potential clients, because the financial gain was the
sole motivation for the solicitation.99 The Court determined that the
state bar appropriately issued a regulation prohibiting such conduct,
and properly assumed responsibility for maintaining standards in the
legal profession.' The Court therefore upheld the disciplinary action
against the attorney.' °
421.
93. Id. at 427-32. "Appellant's letter . . . comes within the generous zone of First
Amendment protection reserved for associational freedoms." Id. at 431.
94. Id. at 428-29.
95. Id. at 434. The Court noted "[the record does not support South Carolina's]
contention that undue influence, overreaching, misrepresentation or invasion of privacy
occurred in this case." Id. at 435. Because the ACLU attorney's activity did not subvert
any of these state interests, she could not be disciplined. Id. at 434-35.
96. 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978).
97. Id. at 449-51. Upon learning of the accident, the attorney phoned the mother of
one of the victims and learned that the victim remained in the hospital. Id. at 449. The
attorney then visited the victim in the hospital, where she lay in traction. Id. at 450. At
the hospital, the attorney asked the victim to sign an agreement allowing him to serve
as her attorney. Id. Subsequently, the attorney visited the second victim the day she
arrived home from the hospital. Id. at 451. The second victim told the attorney that she
did not understand what was going on; nonetheless, the attorney pursued the matter until
she agreed to hire him on a contingency basis. Id. The parents of both victims filed
complaints with the local bar association. Id. at 452.
98. Id. at 468.
99. Id. at 458. The dangers involved included overreaching and undue influence, as
well as "using information as bait" to obtain clients. Id.
100. Id. at 464.
101. Id. at 468.
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2. Applying Central Hudson to Attorney Advertising
The Supreme Court first applied Central Hudson to attorney
advertising in In re R.M.J. 02 The R.M.J. decision addressed the con-
stitutionality of a state bar regulation that restricted the use of mass
mailings from lawyers to an untargeted population.'0 3 The Court
struck down the regulation, holding that the state bar impermissibly
prohibited attorney advertisements. 1 4
Applying the Central Hudson factors, the Court first determined that
the advertisements placed by an attorney were not misleading simply
because they failed to quote verbatim the regulation's permissible areas
of practice list; therefore, the advertisements fell within the scope of
commercial speech and were entitled to First Amendment protection.'0 5
Second, the Court looked for a substantial state interest to justify the
regulation.' 6 Finding that the bar failed to assert any interest, much
less a substantial interest in promulgating its regulation, the Court con-
cluded that an absolute prohibition on advertisements was unwar-
ranted. 107
Subsequently, in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,08 the
Court again overturned a state bar's restriction of legal advertisements
placed in newspapers.'0 9 Applying Central Hudson, the Court first
102. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
103. Id. at 194-98. Missouri Supreme Court Rule 4 allowed attorneys to mail
professional announcement cards to a limited population, including personal friends,
relatives, other attorneys, existing clients, and former clients. Id. at 196. Additionally,
Rule 4 provided that if an attorney wished to advertise an area of practice, that attorney
would have to use the descriptions set forth in the statute, verbatim. Id. at 194-95. A
Missouri attorney was charged with violating Rule 4 for publishing advertisements in
the yellow pages, and for mailing advertisements to individuals outside of the proscribed
list in the regulation. Id. at 196-97. The advertisements described the attorney's areas
of practice as "real estate," but Rule 4 required the term "property law." Id. at 197. The
attorney also included "contracts," "zoning and land use," and "communication" areas of
practice not included in the permissible areas of practice list. Id.
104. Id. at 207.
105. Id. at 205. The Court reasoned that there was no danger of public deception in
classifying an area of practice as "real estate" instead of "property law." Id. See supra
part II.A.2. for a discussion of Central Hudson.
106. R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 205.
107. Id.
108. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
109. Id. at 655-56. In Zauderer, an attorney placed an ad which included a drawing of
an intrauterine device, and the slogan: "DID YOU USE THIS IUD?" to inform the public
of his willingness to represent women injured by the device. Id. at 630-31. The
advertisement violated Ohio Disciplinary Rule 2-101. Id. at 632-33. The Ohio rule
prohibited deceptive advertising, prohibited the use of illustrations in advertisements,
and mandated that lawyer advertisements be dignified. Id. at 631-32. The State Bar
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concluded that the advertisement was not misleading or untruthful." 0
The bar, however, asserted an interest in preventing "the use of false
or misleading advertising to stir up meritless litigation against innocent
defendants.""'.. The Court retorted that it would not view litigation as
an evil." 2 The Court also noted that the bar failed to offer any evi-
dence supporting its contentions." 13 Thus, the Court again failed to
find a substantial state interest warranting a complete ban on attorney
advertising, and the Court again struck down an attempt to regulate
attorney advertising." 4
In 1988, the Supreme Court invalidated yet another regulation of
attorney advertising in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, '" holding that
a rule banning all direct-mail solicitation was impermissibly broad." 16
The Court distinguished in-person solicitations, which a state bar
could ban," 7 from targeted direct-mail solicitations." 8 Initially, the
Court noted that direct-mail advertising presented less of a risk than the
forbidden in-person solicitation.' 9 The Court reasoned that a letter,
unlike an in-person solicitation, does not pressure the recipient to
answer immediately.
20
Association sought to discipline Zauderer. Id. at 631, 636. Zauderer appealed the
disciplinary action, arguing that it violated his First Amendment rights. Id.
1 10. Id. at 639-40.
I 11. Id. at 643. The Court did not strike down the entire regulatory statute, but did
strike down the restrictions on the use of illustrations in advertisements. Id. at 655-56.
112. Id. at 643. "[Wie cannot endorse the proposition that a lawsuit, as such, is an
evil .... That our citizens have access to their civil courts is not an evil to be regretted;
rather, it is an attribute of our system of justice in which we ought to take pride." Id.
113. Id. at 648-49.
114. Id. at 648, 655-56.
115. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
116. Id. at 479-80. In Shapero, the attorney applied to the Kentucky Attorney's
Advertising Association for approval to solicit potential clients. Id. at 469. The
attorney requested permission to send a letter to members of a class of persons who
recently had foreclosure suits filed against them. Id. The advertising association
conceded that the letter was not misleading, but nevertheless denied the attorney's
request to send the letter. Id. The board reasoned that Kentucky's Supreme Court Rules
prohibited Shapero from sending advertisements to clients known to have specific legal
problems. Id. at 469-70. The board further contended that it had a substantial interest in
preventing the potential abuse resulting from the solicitation of clients known to have
particular legal needs. Id. at 474.
On review, the Kentucky Supreme Court, with no explanation, replaced the Supreme
Court rule affecting Shapero with ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 7.3, banning
all direct mail solicitation of prospective clients. Id. at 470-71.
1 17. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978). For a discussion of
Ohralik, see supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
1 18. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 472.
119. Id. at 475.
120. Id. "Unlike the potential client with a badgering advocate breathing down his
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Additionally, the Court disagreed with the bar's contention that
protecting the privacy of the recipients constituted a substantial state
interest.' 2' According to the Court, direct-mail advertising was not as
invasive as an in-person solicitation. 22 The Court emphasized that the
invasion of privacy in direct-mail solicitations occurred when the
lawyer learned of the recipient's situation, not when he solicited the
individual. 23 Thus, the Court based its holding on the view that the
direct-mail advertisement in Shapero, was less problematic than the in-
person solicitation in Ohralik. 24 Absent a showing that a complete
ban on targeted, direct-mail advertisements advanced a state interest,
the Court concluded that the state interest could not be substantial, and
thus violated the Central Hudson test.'2s The Court therefore held that
the regulation violated the attorney's First Amendment rights. 26
In the attorney advertising cases from Bates to Shapero, the
Supreme Court firmly established that a complete ban on truthful, non-
deceptive attorney advertising violated the First Amendment. 27 At the
same time, the Court continued to reiterate that regulation of attorney
advertising would be permissible if a state bar could show that the reg-
ulation materially advanced a substantial state interest and was nar-
rowly tailored to meet that interest. 28 In essence, the Court continued
to express its willingness to allow regulation of attorney advertising,
but state bar associations repeatedly failed to promulgate a regulation
that met the level of scrutiny required by Central Hudson.
neck, the recipient of a letter and the 'reader of the advertisement . . . can effectively
avoid further bombardment of [his] sensibilities by simply averting [his] eyes."' Id.
(quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 465 n.25).
121. Id. at 476.
122. Id. at 475-76.
123. Id. at 476.
124. Id. at 475-76. Justice O'Connor vehemently dissented on this point. Id. at
480-83 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She argued that unsolicited legal advice, regardless
of the form of its receipt, must be carefully monitored. Id. at 481 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). Justice O'Connor also explained that because the public views attorneys as
having authority, a personalized letter from an attorney may be more difficult to ignore
than unsolicited advertisements for commercial products. Id. at 481-82 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
125. Id. at 479. See supra part II.A.2 for a discussion of the Central Hudson test.
126. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 479 (1988).
127. See supra part il.B.
128. See supra part Il.B.
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III. DISCUSSION
A. The Facts of the Case
In 1989, the Florida State Bar commissioned a two-year study on
the effects of attorney advertising on public opinion. 29 The study
revealed that "the Florida public views direct-mail solicitations in the
immediate wake of accidents as an intrusion on privacy that reflects
poorly on the profession.' ' 30 Following the completion of this study,
the Florida State Bar petitioned the Florida Supreme Court to amend its
rules pertaining to attorney advertising in an attempt to improve the
image of the legal profession and promote a more efficient system of
justice.' 3' Subsequently, the Florida Supreme Court approved two
rules prohibiting personal injury lawyers from soliciting new clients by
means of targeted, direct mail solicitation within thirty days after an
accident. 32 These rules generally provide that no attorney, or attorney
referral agency, could contact an accident victim or surviving family
member by mail for thirty days. 33
129. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2374 (1995).
130. Id. at 2377.
13 1. The Florida Bar: Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar-
Advertising Issues, 571 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1991). The Bar contended that its proposed
changes would address problems unearthed by its study. Id. at 455. The Florida Bar
Commission on Advertising and Solicitation found two particular problems to be: (1)
advertising that appeals to a prospective client's emotions over rational decision-
making, and (2) advertising that hinders the administration of justice, namely direct
mail solicitations. Id.
132. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR, Rule 4-7.4(b)(l)(A) (amended 1995);
RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 4-7.8(a) (amended 1995). Rule 4-7.4(b) states
as follows:
(1) A lawyer shall not send, or knowingly permit to be sent, on the lawyer's
behalf or on behalf of the lawyer's firm, or partner, an associate, or any other
lawyer affiliated with the lawyer or the lawyer's firm, a written communication
to a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining professional employment
if: (A) The written communication concerns an action for personal injury or
wrongful death or otherwise relates to an accident or disaster involving the
person to whom the communication is addressed or a relative of that person,
unless the accident or disaster occurred more than 30 days prior to the mailing
of the communication.
RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR, Rule 4-7.4(b)(l)(A) (amended 1995). Rule 4-7.8(a)
provides:
A lawyer shall not accept referrals from a lawyer referral service unless the
service: (1) engages in no communication with the public and in no direct
contact with prospective clients in a manner that would violate the Rules of
Professional Conduct if the communication or contact were made by the
lawyer.
RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR, Rule 4-7.8(a) (amended 1995).
133. See supra note 132 for the full text of the Bar rules.
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In March 1992, G. Stewart McHenry filed suit against the Florida
Bar (the "Bar") on behalf of himself and Went For It, Inc., his wholly
owned attorney referral agency.' 34 McHenry stated that both he and
his attorney referral agency normally obtained new business in the
manner now prohibited by the new Bar regulations.13' He sued to
enjoin enforcement of the new rules, arguing that the regulation of
direct-mail solicitation violated his First Amendment right to free
speech,136  because the rules prevented the free flow of important
information to particular consumers who needed to become aware of
their legal rights. 137
The Bar, on the other hand, argued that it had a substantial interest
in "maintaining the professionalism of the bar and public confidence in
the administration of justice.' 38 The Bar requested the court to give
states the authority needed to regulate attorney advertising, which ad-
versely affected their interests in maintaining the integrity of the legal
profession. 139
B. Lower Court Holdings
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida
entered summary judgment on behalf of McHenry.' 4° The court held
that the proposed state interests in the case at hand were indistinguish-
able from those rejected by the Supreme Court in Shapero.4 ' The
134. McHenry v. Florida, 808 F. Supp. 1543 (M.D. Fla. 1992) [hereinafter McHenry
1], aff'd, 21 F.3d 1038 (11 th Cir. 1994), rev'd, Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S.
Ct. 2731 (1995). McHenry was later disbarred for reasons unrelated to this lawsuit.
Florida Bar v. McHenry, 605 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 1992). Another lawyer, John T. Blakely,
was substituted for McHenry. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2374.
135. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at2374.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 2377-78.
138. Id. at 2376-77.
139. Id.
140. McHenry 1, 808 F. Supp. at 1548. Both parties had filed motions for summary
judgment. Id. at 1544. The District Court referred the motions to a magistrate judge,
who recommended that summary judgment be entered in favor of the Bar. Id. The
magistrate determined that the Bar had substantial interests in protecting both the
privacy and tranquillity of accident victims from possible overreaching or undue
influence of lawyers. Id. See also Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371,
2374 (1995) (recognizing that the magistrate was concerned with the tranquillity of
accident victims and the possibility of undue influence). He cited the Bar's study as
evidence of the tailored nature of the regulation to the problem. Id.
141. McHenry 1, 808 F. Supp. at 1546. The Court in Shapero held that "the State
may not constitutionally ban a particular letter on the theory that to mail it only to
those whom it would most interest is somehow inherently objectionable." Shapero v.
Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 473-74 (1988). See supra notes 115-26 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Shapero.
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court therefore concluded that no substantial state interest existed to
validate the regulation of direct-mail solicitation. 42
Furthermore, the court rejected the Bar's argument that the regu-
lation should be upheld because it did not completely ban direct-mail
solicitation. 43 The court found that even if the Bar offered a substan-
tial state interest to support the regulation, the thirty-day ban was not
sufficiently narrowly tailored.' 44 Thus, the district court held that the
State's regulation violated the First Amendment. 45
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit af-
firmed the district court's holding. 46 The appellate court agreed that
Shapero was the leading case on point concerning targeted direct-mail
solicitation.141 In deciding the case, the court asserted that the mode of
communication was the relevant inquiry in determining whether the
regulation satisfied the constitutional analysis. 48 According to the
Eleventh Circuit, unlike other forms of communication, a letter was
not invasive or coercive, even where the recipient was overcome with
grief or personal injury. 149
The court of appeals, interpreting Supreme Court precedent, also
agreed that the Bar had no substantial interest in preserving the person-
The Bar proposed that Florida had two substantial interests in promulgating the
legislation: (1) to protect those recently traumatized by an accident, and who are
unlikely to be able to objectively evaluate personal lawyer solicitations, and (2) to
protect the privacy and tranquillity of these individuals. McHenry v. Florida Bar, 21
F.3d 1038, 1042 (1 th Cir. 1994) [hereinafter McHenry 11], rev'd, Florida Bar v. Went
For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2731 (1995).
142. McHenry 1, 808 F. Supp. at 1547. The district court also rejected the Bar's
alternative argument that the 30-day ban is equivalent to a justifiable time, place and
manner restriction on political and ideological speech. Id. The court construed Shapero
as precluding any limitations on direct-mail solicitation. Id. at 1546. The court
emphasized that a letter can be ignored, discarded or placed away, to be looked at a later
time. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. The court was applying the factors outlined in Central Hudson Gas & Electric
v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). The court also determined that the
Bar failed to meet the first Central Hudson prong because forcing a lawyer to wait 30
days before soliciting an accident victim would not affect any tendency for the letter to
be misleading. McHenry 1, 808 F. Supp. at 1546. The content of the letter would be the
same in the presence or absence of the regulation. Id.
145. Id. at 1548.
146. McHenry II, 21 F.3d 1038.
147. Id. at 1043.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1042. The court distinguished the receipt of a letter from an in-person
confrontation, as well as other situations where a potential client feels pressure to give
"'an immediate yes-or-no-answer to the offer of representation."' ld. (quoting Shapero
v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 473 (1988)).
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al privacy and tranquillity of accident victims or their surviving fami-
lies. 5 The court determined that the attorney violated the victim's
privacy when the attorney first learned of the accident, not when he
solicited the victim for business. 5 ' A targeted, direct-mail solicitation
would therefore not invade the recipient's privacy any more than a
mass mailing. 5 2 Thus, the court upheld the district court's decision
overturning the regulation as a violation of the attorney's First
Amendment Rights.
53
C. The United States Supreme Court Opinion
A divided Supreme Court narrowly overturned the decisions of both
lower courts by a vote of five to four. 5 4 The Court held that the
thirty-day restriction on targeted direct-mail solicitations did not violate
the First Amendment rights of Florida attorneys or attorney referral
agencies. 5 5 Thus, for the first time since Primus,56 the Court upheld
a regulation of attorney advertising.5 7
150. Id. at 1044. The court also rejected any comparison of direct-mail solicitation
to recent Supreme Court cases prohibiting home privacy invasion in anti-abortion
protests or loud noises from trucks. Id. (referring to Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474
(1988) (anti-abortionists picketing in front of the home of doctor who performs
abortions); and Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (trucks blasting loud noises at
residential homes)).
15 1. Id. The Court did recognize that the letter may be offensive, however, and it
stated that it "appreciate[d] the Bar's attempt to protect an individual's personal privacy,
and to preserve the integrity of the legal profession, by eliminating offensive
solicitations such as these." Id. at 1043-44.
1 52. Id. (quoting Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 476 (1988)).
153. Id. at 1038. The court concluded, however, by stating:
We are disturbed that Bates and its progeny require the decision we reach
today. We are forced to recognize that there are members of our profession
who would mail solicitation letters to persons in grief, and we find The Florida
Bar's attempt to regulate such intrusions entirely understandable. Although
the Bar may not formally restrict such behavior, an attorney's conscience,
self-respect, and respect for the profession should dictate self-restraint in this
area. To preserve the law as a learned profession demands as much.
Id. at 1045.
154. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995). Twenty-nine state and
local bar associations filed amicus curiae briefs on behalf of the Florida Bar. Lawyer
Advertising; Direct Mailings to Accident Victims; First Amendment, 63 U.S.L.W. 3594
(U.S. Feb. 14, 1995).
155. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2371.
156. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978). See supra notes 92-95 and
accompanying text.
157. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2381.
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1. The Majority Opinion' 8
The Court, applying Central Hudson, first examined whether the
Bar asserted a substantial interest in promulgating the restriction on
commercial speech.' 9 The Bar asserted that preserving the integrity of
the legal profession, by protecting the privacy and tranquillity of
accident victims and their families from intrusive direct-mail solici-
tation, constituted such an interest.1
60
The majority did not directly determine that the State had a substan-
tial interest in protecting the image of its profession.' 6' Rather, the
Court focused on past precedent, which "[left] no room for doubt" that
professional regulation and client privacy were substantial state
interests. 62 The Court emphasized that states not only have an interest
in protecting consumers and regulating commercial transactions, but
that states also play a special role in regulating the practice of profes-
sionals. 63 Combined with the Court's previous statement that these
interests "obviously [factor] into the Bar's paramount (and repeatedly
professed) objective of curbing activities that 'negatively affec[t] the
administration of justice,"' the Court construed a substantial state inter-
est in protecting the image of the legal profession.' 6
158. Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion, accompanied by Justices Rehnquist,
Scalia, Thomas, and Breyer. Id. at 2371. O'Connor had vigorously dissented in
Shapero. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
159. The Bar conceded that the advertisement was not misleading or deceptive, thus
removing the necessity for judicial debate over the first prong of Central Hudson. Went
For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2376. The Court therefore focused on the second, third, and fourth
components of the Central Hudson analysis. Id. See supra notes 65-66 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the Central Hudson factors.
160. Brief for Petitioner at *8, *25-*27, Went For It, 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995) (No.
94-226) (LEXIS, Genfed library, US PLUS file).
161. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2376.
162. Id. "States have a compelling interest in the practice of professions within
their boundaries, and ... as part of their power to protect the public health, safety, and
other valid interests they have broad power to establish standards for licensing
practitioners and regulating the practice of professions." Id. (quoting Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975)).
163. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2376. See also Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484-
85 (1988) ("[A] special benefit of the privacy all citizens enjoy within their own walls,
which the State may legislate to protect, is an ability to avoid intrusions."); Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980) ("The State's interest in protecting the well-being,
tranquillity, and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in a free and
civilized society."); Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 792 (recognizing that states may regulate the
ethics of a profession).
164. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2376 (quoting the Florida Bar: Petition to Amend the
Rules Regulating the Florida Bar-Advertising Issues, 571 So. 2d 451, 455 (Fla.
1991)).
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Upon finding a substantial state interest, the Court proceeded to the
third Central Hudson prong, and found that the thirty-day restriction
on direct-mail solicitation materially advanced the Bar's asserted inter-
est. 65 The Court relied heavily on the Bar's study commissioned to
uncover the effects of direct-mail solicitation on the legal profession.'66
Lauding the study for its "breadth and detail," the Court referred to ex-
cerpts of complaints from recipients of direct-mail solicitation which,
according to the majority, highlighted the animosity of the public to-
ward attorneys as a result of this kind of advertising. 67 Because the
results of the study were never refuted by Went For It, Inc., the Court
found the third Central Hudson prong satisfied. 68
The Court then turned to the fourth Central Hudson prong, examin-
ing whether the regulation served the Bar's interests. In deciding this
issue, the Court emphasized the distinction between ordinary First
Amendment rights, and the protection granted to commercial
speech. 69 The Court stated that restrictions on direct-mail solicita-
tions, as commercial speech, need not be the least restrictive avail-
able. 70 Rather, the Court simply required that the fit be reasonable.' 7'
165. Id. at 2377. Cf. Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993) (holding unconstitu-
tional an in-person solicitation ban on a Florida accountant). The Court in Went For It
distinguished Edenfield on the basis that in that case, the state alleged nothing to
substantiate its allegations of harm. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2377.
1 66. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2377. Fifty-four percent of the population at large
felt that direct-mail advertisements constituted an invasion of privacy. Id. Twenty-
seven percent of recipients of the advertising felt it reflected negatively on the legal
profession. Id.
167. Id. One recipient described that he was "appalled and angered by the brazen
attempt" to obtain his business after he was injured in an automobile accident in which
his fiancee was killed. Id. at 2377-78 (quoting from Summary of Record, App. I(1), at
2). Others found such conduct "despicable and inexcusable," and "beyond compre-
hension." Id. at 2378 (quoting from Summary of Record, App. I (1), at 2).
168. Id. at 2378. The dissent questioned the validity of the study, based on the lack
of empirical data to support the alleged substantial interest. Id. at 2384 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). The majority responded to this questioning by asserting that no case
precedent required the Bar to produce such data. Id. at 2378. Furthermore, the Court cited
numerous cases where the Court justified speech restrictions by merely referring to other
studies, or by using "simple common sense." Id. (quoting Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S.
191, 211 (1992)). See also Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 584-85 (1991)
(stating that "legislation need not await local proof," but may rely on other studies);
City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1986) (holding that a
party was entitled to rely on a study described in detail in another case).
169. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2380.
170. Id. For an in-depth discussion of this issue, see Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492
U.S. 469, 476-81 (1989) (holding that governmental restrictions on commercial speech
need not be the least restrictive means available).
171. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2380.
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The Court dismissed the attorney's assertion that the restriction was
overly broad because it prohibited the solicitation of all victims, re-
gardless of their subjective state of mind or the severity of their
injury.172 The Court asserted that tailoring a regulation to account for
the varying levels of injury, or to account for differing levels of ani-
mosity towards receiving direct-mail solicitations, exceeded the level
of specificity required by the Constitution.77 The Court further con-
cluded that the State was not presented with 'numerous and obvious
less-burdensome alternatives' to its thirty-day ban.77 Thus, the Court
found that the regulation was narrowly tailored to serve the state inter-
est.
The Court also disagreed with the attorney's assertion that the regu-
lation prevented the necessary dissemination of legal information to
those who need it most.'" The attorney argued that accident victims
needed to learn of their rights as quickly as possible, because opposing
counsel and insurance collectors would begin to examine evidence im-
mediately. 176 The Court dismissed this concern, reasoning that the
brevity of the restriction, and the numerous other channels available to
disseminate legal options to accident victims provided adequate ave-
nues for victims to learn of their legal rights.177
In addition to evaluating the regulation under Central Hudson, the
Supreme Court addressed the lower courts' reliance on the Shapero
decision.77 The Court took special issue with the lower courts' find-
ing that a targeted mailing would not invade the recipient's privacy any
more than a mass mailing advertisement. ' The majority argued that a
mass mailing is sent to the public at large, with no special knowledge
of the particular legal needs of the recipients.'8t In such a situation, an
accident victim receiving a general mailing is less likely to develop ani-
mosity toward the sender, because the lawyer did not seek out the
172. Id. The Court also noted the impossibility of creating a regulation so narrowly
tailored that it would allow for differing regulations based on the severity of injury and
willingness of the recipient to receive the solicitation. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. (quoting Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1510 n.13
(1993)).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. Under Florida law, lawyers are not restricted from advertising on television,
in newspapers, on billboards, through mass mailings or legal directories. Id.
178. Id. at 2378.
179. Id. The Eleventh Circuit had found that the invasion of privacy occurred when
the lawyer learned of the accident, not when the accident victim received the direct
mailing. See supra notes 146-53 and accompanying text.
180. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2379.
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victims' tragedy to profit financially. 8' On the other hand, a targeted,
direct-mailing involves a "willful or knowing affront to... the tran-
quillity of bereaved or injured individuals" at the time that it is
received. 82
The majority further distinguished Shapero from Went For It in
three fundamental ways. 83 First, the Court emphasized that Shapero
focused on a state's interest in preventing overreaching and undue
influence on potential clients.' 84 In comparison, Went For It hinged
on a finding that Florida had a substantial interest in protecting client
privacy and in professional regulation. 85 Second, the Court empha-
sized that in Shapero, the state attempted to ban targeted mailings
outright and indefinitely. 86 In Went For It, on the other hand, Florida
merely imposed a thirty-day delay. 87 Lastly, the Court found that the
state, in Shapero, did not offer evidence to support its contention that
the ban was necessary.188 In contrast, in Went For It, the Bar sub-
mitted the results of a two-year study showing the negative effects of
attorney advertising on the public image of the legal profession. 89
The Court similarly dismissed the lower courts' reliance on the
Bolger decision.' 9° It reasoned that the demonstrable effect of direct-
mail solicitations to accident victims and their families, during their
time of bereavement shortly after an accident, could not be eliminated
by simply discarding a letter.'9' The Court stated that the harm caused
181. Id.
182. Id. The Court stated that a lawyer does not invade the victim's privacy when
first learning about the victim's accident for two reasons: (1) the victim does not know
when the lawyer learns of the accident, and (2) the lawyer often initially learns of
accidents through a public source. Id.
183. Id. at 2378.
184. Id. The Court asserted that in Shapero, the state attempted to justify restrictions
on targeted, direct mailings to avoid "the special dangers of overreaching inherent in
targeted solicitations," not to protect the privacy of the intended recipient. Id.
Overreaching is defined as: "that which results from an inequality of bargaining power
or other circumstances in which there is an absence of meaningful choice on the part of
one of the parties." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 763 (6th ed. 1991).
185. See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 115-26 and accompanying text.
187. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2374.
188. Id. at 2378-79.
189. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
190. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2379. In Bolger, the Court found the government's
allegations of harm to be lacking, because recipients of direct-mail advertisements for
contraceptives could simply avert their eyes and dispose of any unwanted solicitation.
Bolger v. Young's Drug Prods. Corp. 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983). See supra notes 67-69
and accompanying text for a discussion of the Bolger decision.
191. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2379. The Court further asserted that the harm was as
much a result of receiving the letter as it was in reading its contents. Id.
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resulted not only from the contents of the letter, but also by its mere
receipt.' 9' Simply "averting one's eyes" from the letter by placing it in
a drawer, or by throwing it away, would not diminish the emotions
triggered by an uninvited solicitation immediately following a traumatic
accident. 193 The Court found that the very act of receiving the letter
triggers emotions and engenders animosity toward the legal profes-
sion, adversely affecting the image of the legal profession.' 94
Concluding that the State's regulation of targeted direct-mail solici-
tation withstood scrutiny under Central Hudson, and was distinguish-
able from past precedent, the Court reversed the appellate court's
decision and declared the regulation to be within the scope of the
Constitution.' 95
2. The Dissenting Opinion 96
The dissent agreed with the majority's contention that the Central
Hudson decision provided the appropriate basis for scrutinizing re-
strictions on commercial speech.' However, the dissent disagreed
with the majority's application of the Central Hudson factors. 98
The dissent analyzed the Bar's proposed interest in two parts: (1)
protecting the privacy of the accident victim and family, and (2) im-
proving the unfavorable reputation of the legal profession. 199 Add-
ressing the privacy interest first, the dissent acknowledged the Court's
previous recognition of a similar interest in some of the Court's past
decisions.20 The dissent argued, however, that in light of Shapero, a
privacy interest could not justify the prohibition of targeted direct-
mail.20' Because the Court in Shapero held that restrictions on direct-
mail solicitation were impermissible to avoid 'over-reaching and undue
influence,' the dissent argued that restrictions to protect personal priva-
cy were likewise unwarranted. 0 2 In the dissenters' opinion, Shapero
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 2381.
196. Justice Kennedy filed the dissenting opinion in which Justices Stevens, Souter
and Ginsburg joined. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 2382 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 2382-86 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 2382-83 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
200. Id. at 2382 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
201. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
202. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S.
466, 475 (1988)). "We reasoned that '[a] letter, like a printed advertisement . . . can
readily be put in a drawer to be considered later, ignored, or discarded."' Id. (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (citing Shapero, 486 U.S. at 475-76).
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stood for the proposition that direct-mail solicitation, as a mode of
communication, did not give rise to any substantial state interest war-
ranting regulation.2 3
The dissent further argued that the majority attempted to evade
Shapero by emphasizing a distinguishable privacy interest stemming
from the offensive nature of direct-mail solicitations. In response,
the dissent stated that the Court had repeatedly denied suppression of
speech based upon the offensiveness of the advertisement.0 5
The dissent also asserted that recipients of direct-mailings are not "a
captive audience," and are therefore not entitled to protection from
offensive speech.20 6 Rather, the dissent argued that recipients of
targeted, direct-mail solicitations could choose to discard any offensive
mailing, as opposed to the captive target of an in-person solicitation
who had no such option. 2" Thus, consistent with Bolger, the dissent
found that attorney solicitation should be entitled to commercial speech
protection. 20 8 Furthermore, the dissent criticized the majority for not
explicitly overruling the cases concerning offensive advertisements.2°
The dissent asserted that the Court should have overruled those cases
if it intended to forbid restrictions on offensive advertisements in the
future.21 0
The dissent next addressed the second proposed interest: protecting
the favorable reputation of the legal profession. 21 ' The dissent dis-
missed this interest by arguing that direct-mail solicitations are not in-
herently unethical or improper. 1 2 Rather, the dissent argued that
direct-mail solicitation may actually "serve vital purposes and promote
the administration of justice" by informing the public about how the
203. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 2382-83 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 2383 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). "[T]hese 'are classically not justifi-
cations validating the suppression of expression protected by the First Amendment."'
Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678,
701 (1977)). "[Tlhe mere possibility that some members of the population might find
advertising . . . offensive cannot justify suppressing it." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 648 (1985)).
206. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463
U.S. 60, 72 (1983); and Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
530, 542 (1980)).
207. Id. at 2383 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 2383, 2386 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 2382-83 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
210. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
211. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
212. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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legal system operates." 3 The dissent acknowledged that the image of
the legal profession was adversely affected by unethical and improper
practices, but denied that direct-mail solicitation was such a practice.1 4
Thus, the dissent determined that the Bar failed to show it possessed a
substantial state interest in enacting the regulation.1 5
Proceeding to the next prong of Central Hudson, the dissent at-
tacked the credibility of the Florida Bar's empirical study. 2 6 The
dissent noted that the State failed to present evidence of the sample
sizes or selection procedures used.21 7 Furthermore, the dissent argued
that only two pages of the study's summary pertained directly to
direct-mail solicitation.2 8
In addition to questioning the study, the dissent argued that a restric-
tion on direct-mail solicitation did not advance any offered state interest
in a direct and material way. 219 The dissent concluded that the State
did not offer adequate evidence to indicate that the restriction would
benefit potential recipients of the solicitation.22
Carrying its conclusion into the last Central Hudson prong, the
dissent asserted that the regulation was not narrowly tailored.22' The
dissent argued that the regulation constituted a flat ban, and did not dif-
ferentiate on the basis of the seriousness of the injury or the subjective
state of the victim's mind.222 If any restriction was required at all,
argued the dissent, the restriction should be tailored to the severity of
the victim's injury.223 Additionally, the dissent found no reason to
assume that all accident victims would find a targeted, direct-mail so-
licitation offensive. 24 Thus, the dissent found the regulation to be
213. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
214. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
215. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
216. Id. at 2384 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
217. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
218. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). While the remaining 32 pages of the study
discussed direct-mail solicitation, they were primarily excerpts from comments made by
lawyers and the public. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
219. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
220. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
221. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 2384-85 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 2385 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). "With regard to lesser injuries, there is
little chance that for any period, much less 30 days, the victims will become distraught
upon hearing from an attorney. It is, in fact, more likely a real risk that some victims
might think no attorney will be interested enough to help them." Id. (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
224. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). "There is, moreover, simply no justification for
assuming that in all or most cases an attorney's advice would be unwelcome or
unnecessary when the survivors or the victim must at once begin assessing their legal
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overly broad because it prohibited solicitation to even the willing
recipient.225
The dissent concluded by offering two additional reasons why it felt
the regulation of direct-mail solicitations was unnecessary.22 First,
the dissent argued that any potential problem was self-policing.227 In-
dividuals who found the solicitation untasteful would simply not do
business with the offending lawyer.228 Offending lawyers, in turn,
would find themselves lacking business and change their practices.229
Lastly, the dissent suggested that restrictions on direct mail solicitation
were harmful because they prevented the dissemination of information
to "victims too ill-informed to know an attorney may be interested in
their cases. 230
IV. ANALYSIS
The United States Supreme Court properly restricted targeted,
direct-mail solicitations to accident victims and their family members.
Both the majority and the dissent agreed on the appropriateness of
applying the Central Hudson test to the facts of Went For It. The
Court split, however, on how each of the three prongs of the test that
were at issue should be applied.
A. Protecting the Image of The Legal Profession:
A Substantial State Interest
The majority opinion correctly concluded that protecting the public
image of the legal profession constitutes a substantial state interest.
23
'
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that states have a substantial
interest in the regulation of professions within their state. 2  The legal
profession is no exception to this rule. Furthermore, where the regu-
and financial position in a rational manner." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
225. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
226. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
227. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
228. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
229. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent also emphasized that most states
allow a disgruntled client to fire his or her attorney if the client does not like the
attorney. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
230. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent claimed that the regulation would
most affect those who, "because they lack education, linguistic ability, or familiarity
with the legal system, are unable to seek out legal services." Id. (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
231. Id. at 2381.
232. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
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lation of the legal profession is at issue, the State has reason for a
heightened interest in regulation.233
This heightened interest in the regulation of the legal profession de-
rives from the unique relationship between the lawyer and the public.
Lawyers "are engaged in the vital task of protecting [the] rights of
individuals and serving as the caretakers of the country's justice
,,234-system.'  - Simply put, lawyers provide the public with access to the
legal system.235 The legal system, in turn, exists to serve the public by
enforcing justice.
Somewhere in time, however, lawyers lost society's respect.236
Mistrust and disrespect for the legal profession deter the public from
accessing the legal system. 237 Therefore, any attempt to improve the
image of the legal profession necessarily improves service to the
public.238
The dissent argued that protecting the public image of lawyers
through the regulation of targeted direct-mail solicitation cannot be a
substantial state interest, because those restrictions hinder the free-flow
233. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 481 (1988) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). In her dissent, Justice O'Connor distinguished unsolicited legal advice
from other unsolicited material that is granted First Amendment protection for three
reasons: (1) the typical consumer will have a more difficult time evaluating the quality
of legal services, and the consequences of mistaken evaluation are more severe; (2)
targeted direct-mail solicitations suggest that the sender has a particular knowledge of,
and concern for the recipient, which a typical consumer may believe because a lawyer is
supposed to put the client's interests before the lawyer's own interests; and (3) targeted
solicitations have an enhanced tendency to contain advice that will induce the consumer
to act in a manner which is in the lawyer's best financial interest. Id. at 481-82. See
supra note 124.
234. COMMISSION ON ADVERTISING, REPORT ON THE SURVEY OF LAWYERS IN ADVERTISING
3 (1990).
235. In their amicus curiae brief to the Supreme Court on behalf of the Florida Bar,
the Association of Trial Lawyers of America said, "If lawyers sold cars, or computers or
corn futures, this would not be a troublesome case .... Preserving the integrity of the
judicial system and the impartiality of jurors are clearly substantial state interests."
Amicus Curiae Brief of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America in Support of the
Petitioner, Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995) (No. 94-226)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, US PLUS File).
236. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE ABA GUIDE TO LEGAL MARKETING: A
COLLECTION OF THE BEST IDEAS, APPROACHES, AND SUCCESS STORIES 1-3 (Susan Raridon &
Gary A. Munneke eds., 1995) (citing possible factors contributing to this decline).
237. See CROSSROADS, supra note 2, at 3 ("The image of the legal profession and the
roles of various factors affecting that image are important to the interests of society.
Public confidence in the profession is essential in order to sustain our justice system.").
238. Cf. id. at 3. The authors note that the role of advertising in shaping the image
of the legal profession is not certain. Id. See infra part IV.B for an analysis of the
relationship of advertising to the public image of the legal profession.
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of information to the consumer. 2 9 This argument operates on the
assumption that direct-mail solicitation always falls within the pro-
tected realm of commercial speech. Under the commercial speech
doctrine, courts strike down advertising restrictions that hinder the free
flow of information because that free flow is necessary to allow the
consumer to make an educated and informed decision.2 40 However,
advertisers do not send targeted direct-mail solicitations to inform
consumers of their available options; such solicitations are therefore
not always entitled to First Amendment protection.24' Rather, these
solicitation letters encourage the recipient to employ the lawyer sending
the solicitation, not to offer a comparison of legal services available to
the recipients.242
Likewise, the free flow of information is not hindered simply
because personal injury attorneys are temporarily prohibited from so-
liciting accident victims. If the dissemination of legal information is
truly the concern of the attorney, the victim can be mailed a purely in-
formational letter without a solicitation. 243 Other methods of informing
239. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2383 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). The dissent states that "direct solicitation may serve vital purposes and
promote the administration of justice." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the
dissent argues that any ban based on protection of "lawyers' reputations . . .
suppress[es] speech that informs how the legal system works." Id. (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). Note that the dissent construes the regulation as protecting the image of
individual lawyers, rather than the asserted state interest of protecting the image of the
legal profession by "curbing activities that 'negatively affec[t] the administration of
justice,"' namely the intrusive invasion of accident victims' privacy. Id. at 2376
(quoting The Florida Bar: Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar-
Advertising Issues, 571 So. 2d 451, 455 (Fla. 1991)).
240. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977).
241. Where an attorney's sole motivation is financial gain, the Court has held that
the state may regulate such communication. Ohralik v. Ohio Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,
457-59 (1978). Cf. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 472 (1988) (finding
that financial gain is an acceptable motivation to engage in advertising practices).
242. John Weber, Note, Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association: United States
Supreme Court Gives First Amendment Protection to Ambulance Chasing Through the
Mail, 26 CAL. W. L. REV. 201, 216 (1990). In its conclusion, the dissent argued that the
ban on direct-mail solicitation will most harm "those who most need legal
representation: . . . the . . . too ill-informed." Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2385
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent effectively argued that the recipient may not be
capable of making an informed decision. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Ironically, this
argument emphasizes the harms of direct-mail solicitation and the need for other, more
effective means of educating the public.
243. See supra note 132 for the text of the new Florida Bar regulations. The prohibi-
tion against sending communications to victims only applies where the attorney is
attempting to solicit that victim as a potential client. Id.
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victims of their options exist as well. The Florida regulation does not
prohibit billboard or television advertising, for instance. 44
Furthermore, the need for lawyers to begin immediately soliciting
victims decreases when victims become more aware of their legal
rights and responsibilities through methods other than direct-mail so-
licitation.245 An informed victim, for example, will be less likely to
make inculpatory statements to opposing counsel, and will be better
equipped to hire an attorney, if the victim recognizes the need to have
evidence examined expediently.24
More and better consumer education about the legal system is
needed. Although targeted, direct-mail solicitations propose to serve
this function, consumer education has become a pretext behind which
personal injury lawyers are hiding. The dissemination of consumer
education should not be motivated by the pecuniary self-interests of
lawyers.
B. Regulation of Targeted Direct-Mail Solicitation Directly and
Materially Advances the State's Interest
The majority correctly determined that a temporary ban on direct-
mail solicitation advances the state's interest in protecting the image of
the legal profession. 247 Restricting targeted direct-mail solicitation di-
rectly and materially advances the state's interest by improving the
public image of the legal profession.248 To this end, the Florida Bar
submitted the results of its two-year study on attorney advertising and
solicitation.249
The undertaking of the study before the attempt to regulate attorney
advertising distinguishes Went For It from previous, unsuccessful
regulations7 ° The study included scientifically conducted surveys as
244. See supra note 132 for the text of the regulations.
245. CROSSROADS, supra note 2, at 6. In 1995, the ABA Commission on Advertising
undertook a comprehensive review of advertising and its effects on the bar. Id. at i.
After compiling their information, the ABA developed a list of strategies to help
improve the bar's failing image. Id. at 5-6. One of their strategies stated as follows:
"There is a need for better public education about the legal system, legal services and
their role in meeting individual solutions. The bar needs to explore ways in which
advertising can contribute toward meeting that need." Id. at 6.
246. Id. at 144-45 ("There continues to be a need . . . for information to help
determine whether people have a legal need and, if so, whether they would benefit from
legal representation in addressing that need.").
247. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2381 (1995).
248. Id. at 2377.
249. Id.
250. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Dade County Trial Lawyers Association and the
American Board of Trial Advocates in Support of the Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at
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well as the results of polls and studies, which provided substantial
evidence addressing the specific advertising method at issue. 25 ' The
study concluded that the public views attorneys who engage in direct-
mail solicitation as having "sacrifice[d] professionalism to promote
their own pecuniary self-interest."" Twenty-seven percent of direct-
mail recipients indicated that they regarded the legal profession less
highly after receiving the solicitation.2 3 Eleven percent admitted that
the advertising affected their opinions about the legal system to such an
extent that it might influence their ability to serve as jurors in a civil
trial.254
In its analysis under Central Hudson, the dissent questioned the
credibility of the study conducted by the Florida Bar.25 5 The Central
Hudson test required the Bar to show that its thirty-day restriction
would serve the State's interest by protecting the image of the legal
profession. Even if the evidence accumulated by the Florida Bar were
in fact empirically weak, however, no Supreme Court precedent re-
quires extensive empirical data. 6 On the contrary, the Court has pre-
viously justified restrictions on speech by accepting mere reference to
*5, Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995) (No. 94-226) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, USPLUS file) [hereinafter Trial Lawyers Amicus Curiae Brief].
Rather than attempting to justify overbroad restrictions on advertising by
relying upon nebulous concepts of professional dignity, like the State of
Arizona in Bates, the Florida Bar instead undertook a detailed and
comprehensive two year study of attorney advertising, which identified
particular problems that needed to be addressed and then carefully crafted its
regulations to remedy the specific problems identified as a result of its study.
Id. [alterations added].
25 1. See id. for a detailed explanation of the studies relied upon by the Florida Bar.
252. Brief for Petitioner on the Merits, Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct.
2371 (1995) (No. 94-226) (LEXIS, Genfed library, USPLUS file).
253. Trial Lawyers Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 250, at *7-*8 (citing Frank N.
Magid Assocs., Attitudes & Opinions of Florida Adults Toward Direct Mail Advertising
by Attorneys (1987)).
254. Id.
255. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2384 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). The dissent called the study "a few pages of self-serving and unsupported
statements by the State." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). It continued to argue that "the
essential thrust of all the material adduced to justify the State's interest is devoted to the
reputational concerns of the Bar." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). It can be argued, how-
ever, that even if the motivation behind the Bar's regulation is purely a self-serving
reputational concern, the effects of the regulation will still benefit the public. See supra
section IV.A.
256. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2378. "In any event, we do not read our case law to
require that empirical data come to us accompanied by a surfeit of background
information." Id.
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other studies not conducted by the parties, or by merely relying on
common sense.
257
C. Regulation of Targeted Direct-Mail Solicitation is Narrowly
Tailored to Serve the State Interest
Lastly, the majority correctly held that the thirty-day proscription of
soliciting accident victims was narrowly tailored to protecting the
image of the legal profession. 258 The dissent argued that "the Bar's
rule create[d] a flat ban that prohibits far more speech than necessary to
serve the purported state interest." 59 In making this claim, the dissent
argued two points. Initially, the dissent argued that the ban was overly
broad because it applied to all accident victims, no matter how severe
the injury. 260 Expressing its concern over this matter, the dissent es-
sentially recognized that there are some circumstances where targeted,
direct-mail solicitations may be inappropriate. Yet, in response, the
dissent advocated a regulation that distinguishes the amount of regu-
lation based upon the severity of the injury.26'
Where, then, is the line drawn? At one end of the spectrum exist
injuries so severe that restrictions on solicitation are unquestionable.262
Logic suggests that trivial injuries lie on the opposite end of the spec-
trum. The dissent suggested that attorneys be able to solicit those
whose injuries are insignificant.263 Yet, if the injuries are insignifi-
cant, there is no need to persuade the victim to litigate 24-only a need
to inform the victims of their rights.265 Victims can naturally still
litigate, if they so choose. Once again, improved consumer education
257. Id.
258. Id. at 2380.
259. Id. at 2384 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
260. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
261. Id. at 2384-85 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that if the criminal
law system can distinguish between varying degrees of bodily harm, then the same can
be accomplished in the civil system. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
262. If the regulation were indeed excessive, as the dissent argues, then the dissent
effectively concedes that an argument could be advanced supporting the regulation of
severely injured victims. Id. at 2385 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Cf. id. (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (responding to the argument that attorneys should still be permitted to
solicit those severely injured, because that is when prompt legal representation is
essential).
263. Id. at 2385 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). "With regard to lesser injuries . . . [i]t is,
in fact, more likely a real risk that some victims might think no attorney will be
interested enough to help them." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
264. See generally WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION 240 (1991)
(addressing the negative effects of litigation on society).
265. See supra notes 243-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the benefits
of consumer legal education.
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about the legal system would better serve the victim than a targeted,
direct-mail solicitation following an accident.26
Furthermore, defining the insignificance of an injury is fraught with
difficulties.267 A minor injury in the eyes of one victim can be a cata-
strophic injury to another.268 A broken leg, for example, may be con-
sidered insignificant by the average citizen. For the professional bas-
ketball player, however, this injury is catastrophic and translates into
large sums of lost income. 269 Thus, for a lawyer to make a deter-
mination of which injury is significant enough to warrant a ban on
solicitation, the lawyer would have to seek out additional information
about the victim, violating the very privacy that the state's regulation
sets out to protect.
Requiring legislation tailored so narrowly as to exclude those
severely injured, or not injured enough, would be appropriate if the
Central Hudson standard included a "least restrictive means" test. 7°
In order to pass constitutional muster, however, the Court requires
only a reasonable fit between the regulation chosen and the end result
the state wishes to achieve.2 7 1 A thirty-day ban on all targeted direct-
mail solicitation, as opposed to a ban without a time limit, is a reason-
able fit because it prohibits solicitation during a time period where
victims and their families are likely to be grieving, recovering, or
otherwise distracted.
The dissent also argued that the regulation is not narrowly tailored
because it does not distinguish permissible regulation based on the
subjective state of the victim's mind.272 The dissent argued that some
victims may wish to be contacted, or at least may not be offended by a
266. See supra notes 243-46 and accompanying text.
267. Cf. Went For It, 115 S. Ct at 2385 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that the
delineation of degrees of bodily harm is feasible because it has been accomplished in the
criminal context).
268. See BRIAN F. HOFFMAN, ET AL., THE EMOTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF PERSONAL
INJURY: A HANDBOOK FOR PSYCHIATRISTS AND LAWYERS 86-87 (1992) (stating that "there
is still a need to develop better descriptive language and assessment tools that will help
clinicians and the insurance or legal systems to assess the changes in a person's life that
are caused by a specific trauma or injury").
269. The average yearly salary for a basketball player in 1994 was $1.5 million.
Steven V. Roberts et al., A Bronx Cheer for Baseball, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug.
22, 1994, at 24.
270. See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of the least
restrictive means test.
271. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2380. The fit required is "a fit that is not necessarily
perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but
one whose scope is 'in proportion to the interest served."' Id. (quoting Board of Trustees
v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)).
272. Id. at 2384-85 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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solicitation. 3 If this is the case, however, those victims who would
welcome legal advice have certainly not been prohibited from seeking
it. The rules regulating the Florida Bar still permit numerous other
methods of legal advertising. 4 The restriction is reasonable in that it
protects those who do not want the solicitation, while permitting those
who do to do so at their own initiative.
V. IMPACT
As was the case following other attorney advertising decisions,
states will undoubtedly continue to regulate the field.275 After Went
For It, states may enact limited bans on targeted, direct-mail solici-
tation for thirty or fewer days. Beyond that, states can begin to test the
limits of how far the Court is willing to justify an asserted state interest
in protecting the image of the legal profession.
The Went For It decision marks the beginning of a new era for
attorney advertising. 276 The decision generated widespread interest
from the beginning, as evidenced by the fact that twenty-nine amicus
curiae briefs were filed by local and state bar associations on behalf of
the Florida Bar.277 As a result, the decision will likely encourage states
to clamp down on attorney advertising in the name of image, but,
"U]ust how far other limits will go remains to be seen. 278
Some of these states, such as Texas, previously enacted similar
laws, which had been declared unconstitutional by their highest state
courts. 279 After the Went For It decision, however, Texas created an
273. Id. at 2385 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
274. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
275. See supra part il.B for a discussion of states' attempts to regulate attorney
advertising.
276. Marcia Coyle, Ad Decision Could Spur a Rollback, NAT'LL.J., July 3, 1995, at
Al (stating that up until the Went For It decision, "lawyer advertising--entitled to First
Amendment commercial speech protection-has been relatively unrestrained; states
have been allowed to regulate it only to prevent false and misleading communications
and to ban in-person solicitation").
277. Lawyer Advertising, supra note 154, at 63.
278. Samuel B. Fineman, Lawyer Advertising Do's and Don'ts; Florida Solicitation
Decisions Could Impact Penna's Rules, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 5, 1995, at 1.
279. Alicia Philley, Ad Review Begins at $50 a Pop; Cheered by the Florida Bar
Decision, State Bar Leaders Set a Lower Fee and Await Avalanche of Applications.
Eighty Percent of the First 90 Applications Violated at Least One of the New Texas
Rules, TEX. LAW., July 3, 1995, at 4 (stating that although state lawyer advertising laws
had previously been declared unconstitutional, the "[c]ourt's tougher stance on lawyer
advertising [was] a green light for the State Bar of Texas' new advertising review
committee"). The Fifth Circuit has since held that a 30-day ban prohibiting attorneys
from employing targeted, direct mail to solicit potential clients is permissible. Moore
v. Morales, 63 F.3d 358, 363 (5th Cir. 1995). The Fifth Circuit remanded the case for
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advertising review board to vigorously scrutinize all attorney
advertising. 280  The New Jersey Supreme Court and the State's
Committee on Attorney Advertising are considering the adoption of a
similar law.28'
Before the Went For It decision, many states had prohibited the so-
licitation of any potential client, if the attorney had reason to believe
that the client's mental state would prevent him from making a rational
decision. 2  This type of regulation, classified as a "know or should
have known" rule, could now be more specifically tailored. States
could now prevent attorneys from soliciting accident victims who have
impaired judgment immediately following a catastrophe.283
The most significant impact of Went For It, however, could very
well be its influence on First Amendment cases involving different
facts. For instance, a recent case cited Went For It to resolve the issue
of soliciting established law firm clients after the firm dissolved.284 In
addition, although they have not yet done so, courts may extend the
Went For It holding beyond the legal profession to other professions,
such as the journalism profession.28 5
The journalism profession, like the legal profession, currently
suffers from a negative public image. 28 6 Regulation of journalists,
however, differs from the regulation of the legal profession in two
further inquiry to determine if the limitation was constitutional as applied to
chiropractors, physicians, surgeons, private investigators and health care personnel.
Id. at 363-64.
280. Philley, supra note 279, at 4.
28 1. Rocco Cammarere, New Ambulance-Chasing Prohibitions on the Way, N.J.
LAW., July 31, 1995, at 1. In addition, the New Jersey Bar Association recently
proposed a unique arrangement to help public interest lawyers, where members of the
state bar will join with the American Red Cross in an effort to provide free legal advice
to victims of disasters. Lisa Brennan, Bar Association to Red Cross: Gimme Shelter,
N.J. L.J., Aug. 7, 1995, at I.
282. Jane Bowling, High Court Ruling Invites New Wave of Curbs on Lawyer Ads: A
Deeply Divided Supreme Court Reinstates Florida Rule Restricting Lawyers from
Sending Targeted Mailings to Recent Accident Victims, DAILY REC., June 22, 1995, at 1.
Maryland is I of approximately 15 states that employ this rule. Id.
283. Id.
284. See Graubard Mollen Dannet & Horowitz v. Moskovitz, 653 N.E.2d 1179 (N.Y.
1995).
285. Jon Shure, Media Should Police Themselves Before Courts Impose Standards,
N.J. LAW., July 3, 1995, at 3 (discussing the factual issues that need to be addressed in
attorney solicitation cases to determine whether an attorney has ethically chosen to
inform his or her clients of their rights to choose their own counsel, or whether an
attorney has secretly tried to lure his or her clients to his or her new firm, without
informing them of their rights in the matter).
286. Id. "Lawyers and journalists have more in common than the fact that the public
tends to hold both professions in low esteem." Id.
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ways: (1) the journalism profession is not governed by industry-wide
standards,287 and (2) journalists opposing regulation of their profes-
sion rely on the specific protection granted to the press by the Consti-
tution. "' Nevertheless, litigation on a case by case basis has created
an ad hoc code of professional standards for journalists.2 9 Some of
the behaviors of journalists that have been regulated are: using an
unreliable source; repeating false information; not including pertinent
information; and intentionally slandering someone.2l
While the Went For It decision explicitly gave state bar associations
permission to regulate the direct-mail solicitation of lawyers, the im-
pact of the decision should be limited to the legal profession because of
a lawyer's unique public duties.2 ' In addition, the journalism profes-
sion can be distinguished from the legal field in its primary purpose.
While both ultimately serve the public, the manner in which they serve
is vastly different. Lawyers are "officers of the court" and members of
the judicial process.292 Journalists, on the other hand, serve the public
by disseminating information.293 Public opinion toward journalists
and other professionals outside the legal field is not as important as
protecting the public itself.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court properly held that a thirty day moratorium on
targeted, direct-mail advertising does not infringe upon the First
Amendment rights of personal injury attorneys. Preserving the
public's faith in the legal system is a substantial state interest, and a
ban on direct mail solicitation in the immediate wake of an accident dir-
ectly and materially advances that interest. Furthermore, such regu-
lation is narrowly tailored when applied to the legal profession.
Caution should be taken, however, in extending this holding outside
the legal profession. The legal profession has a unique relationship to
the judicial system that warrants more prohibitive regulation. Recog-
287. Brian C. Murchison et al., Sullivan's Paradox: The Emergence of Judicial
Standards of Journalism, 73 N.C. L. Rev. 7, 12 (1994).
288. Randall P. Bezanson, See Institutional Speech, 80 IOWA L. REV. 735 (1995)
(comparing freedom of speech with freedom of the press).
289. Murchison, supra note 287, at 12.
290. See generally id. at 12 (discussing numerous behaviors of journalists that have
been litigated).
29 1. See supra notes 233-35 for a discussion of a lawyer's unique public duties.
292. See supra notes 233-35 and accompanying text.
293. But see Shure, supra note 285, at 3 (postulating that the media is leaning more
and more toward entertainment than informing the public).
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nition of this difference will help ensure justice by focusing attention
on the needs of the people instead of the financial interests of
attorneys.
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